INTRODUCTION
For lack of our imagination, this Article does not have the most scintillating title. The subject matter, however, is critically important. We survey prominent kinds of disclosures in law and show why the disclosure tool, though subject to substantial criticism, is central to the legitimacy of any legal regime. Our working example is the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Software Contracts' ("ALI Principles").
The ALI Principles include three kinds of disclosure: disclosure of facts (concerning the quality of software), disclosure of terms (of standard forms), and disclosure of postcontract intentions (to pursue remote disablement of software). We take up each respectively in the three Parts that follow and show how these forms of disclosure promote important social values and goals.
I. DISCLOSING FACTS
Section 3.05(b) of the ALI Principles provides that a party that transfers software (by sale, license, or otherwise) and receives money or a monetary obligation warrants "that the software contains no material hidden defects of which the transferor was aware at the time of The authors thank George Hay, Stewart Schwab, and the faculties of Boston University School of Law and Cornell Law School for their comments. Daniel Forester provided excellent research assistance.
1 ALI, Principles of the Law: Software Contracts (2010) ("ALI Principles"). We disclose that we are the Reporters for this project.
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A. Economic Efficiency
As a general matter, the efficiency standard calls for "the adoption of legal rules that facilitate the movement of assets to their most productive uses with as few transaction costs as possible."' A duty to disclose material defects contributes to this goal in several ways. For example, the duty increases the flow of information and therefore the likelihood that each party will value what it gets more than what it gives up. In addition, a disclosure duty allocates the risk of material defects to the party best able to accommodate or avoid them. As a comment to § 3.05(b) states: "Hidden material defects, known to the software [licensor] but not disclosed, shift costs to the [licensee] who cannot learn of the defects until it is too late and therefore cannot protect itself."' A disclosure duty should also create incentives for the software licensor to improve the quality of its software. ' Disclosure also reduces transaction costs. For example, § 3.05(b) applies only if the licensee cannot reasonably ascertain the material defect." Therefore, a licensee need not engage in a costly and ultimately useless investigation to uncover material defects, information already in the possession of the licensor."
But does the duty to disclose material defects create other costs that outweigh the benefits of the rule?" One prominent issue in the literature of disclosure law is the effect of disclosure on the incentives to "generate and utilize [ ] information in the first place."" Professor Anthony Kronman argues that the law does not require disclosure of deliberately acquired information in order to create an incentive to acquire the information. For example, a company might not search for oil if it had to disclose its findings to a prospective seller of the land, who obviously would raise the price if he knew of the oil. Requiring the disclosure of casually acquired information, on the other hand, does not discourage the production of information."
Analysts are almost unanimous in concluding that disclosure of important information by sellers is desirable notwithstanding Kronman's analysis." For example, Professor Michael Trebilcock urges that sellers must disclose adverse information because nondisclosure would "substantially impair the expected value of the transaction to the buyer," whereas the adverse information is a "sunk cost" for the seller." The role of the law is to deter "further misallocat[ion]" of the resources." In addition, sellers would likely acquire information about their assets even if required to disclose the information." This certainly is likely in the case of software licensors, who inevitably uncover problems with their software in the process of engineering, debugging, and manufacturing it."' An additional potential cost of disclosure identified in the literature is that it would require wasteful disclosures of either unimportant 12 See Craswell, 92 Va L Rev at 566-67 (cited in note 8) ("In deciding whether any given disclosure is desirable, both benefits and costs must be considered.").
13 Trebilcock, Limits of Freedom of Contract at 112 (cited in note 6). In a twist, Professor Steven Shavell worries about excessive investment in information. He points out that "[w]here information has low social value, its costly acquisition should be discouraged, suggesting the desirability of requiring its disclosure. 15 See, for example, Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law at 333 (cited in note 13) ("The appeal of requiring disclosure is stronger when sellers possess information than when buyers do, for the simple reason that it is buyers who typically can make socially valuable use of information."); Eisenberg, 91 Cal L Rev at 1676 (cited in note 11). 16 Trebilcock, Limits of Freedom of Contract at 114 (cited in note 6). 17 Id. 18 Trebilcock writes that a seller's product information is "casually acquired in the sense that enforced disclosure is unlikely to diminish significantly [] investment." Id at 113. See also id at 112; Eisenberg, 91 Cal L Rev at 1676 (cited in note 11).
19 A software licensor might argue that debugging is itself an investment, but it is an investment that licensors likely make to ensure the profitability of their software. information or information the buyer already knows." In such situations, the costs of disclosing minor information likely exceed the benefits to the party receiving the information. Further, if that party already has the information, the costs of disclosure are "redundant."21 But § 3.05(b) does not apply to defects the licensee knows about or to immaterial defects. Another related problem with disclosure is that it might "obscur[e] other, more important information."' But there is hardly more important information than that the software contains defects that render it substantially useless.
Those opposed to the material defect disclosure rule focus on still another possible cost of disclosure, namely its administrative costs. For example, is the rule clear enough to deflect unwarranted claims? Does the rule create unmanageable proof issues?' Does the rule create unduly costly notification requirements? We submit that the administrative costs of § 3.05(b) should be quite manageable mainly because the rule borrows from longstanding existing law that clarifies issues, including the law of material breach and reasonable expectations. A comment to the section elaborates on the operation and boundaries of the rule: whether the injured party received substantially what it bargained for and reasonably expected, inform[s] the court's decision on whether a defect is material. Software that requires major workarounds to achieve contract-promised functionality and that 20 See, for example, Trebilcock, Limits of Freedom of Contract at 107, 112 (cited in note 6). See also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 113 (cited in note 11) ("The case for requiring disclosure is strongest when a product characteristic is not ascertainable by the consumer at low cost.").
21 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 113 (cited in note 11).
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Craswell, 92 Va L Rev at 566 (cited in note 8).
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Trebilcock worries about such costs, but recognizes that "administrative costs cannot be absolutely determinative of contract rules or we would simply ban all actions for breach of contract." Trebilcock, Limits of Freedom of Contract at 115 (cited in note 6).
Failure to disclose can be a real problem in the world of technology. Finally, opponents are troubled because the disclosure rule is mandatory. Case law, however, supports the proposition that a party cannot contract away responsibility for fraud.' In addition, the argument in favor of mandatory disclosure is heightened in the case of standard form contracts where the licensee typically is not even aware of disclaimers. 26 Even in negotiated deals, a reasonable licensee would believe that an "as is" clause or the like insulates a licensor from liability for defects that are known or unknown by both parties at the time of contracting, not those known and knowable by only the licensor that render the software substantially worthless. For such reasons, the law should not aid and abet fraud.
Mandatory disclosure of material defects in market software serves still another purpose. Disclosure means potential access by other software users to information about the quality of a licensor's software. Sharing such information is consistent with the spirit of the growing software commons movement. For the reasons discussed, we are confident that the benefits of § 3.05(b) outweigh its costs. Those less certain, however, might argue that nonlegal sanctions are sufficient to produce optimal disclosure. For example, licensors do not want to injure their reputations by distributing close-to-worthless software. But licensors may be able to hide behind software's tendency to contain bugs and avoid the loss of many customers despite licensing software they know to be dysfunctional.' Further, fly-by-night software licensors that can "exit the market at low cost" and large licensors that enjoy a quasi-monopoly position would be less motivated by reputational concerns.' Finally, licensors who infrequently market software with known hidden defects may believe that the damage to their reputations from nondisclosure of those defects will be minimal.
A frequent additional argument of those who oppose consumer protection is that sellers will simply raise prices." Software licensors adopting this argument with respect to § 3.05(b) would be in the unusual position of having to claim that they will raise prices if they are not permitted to conceal material facts fraudulently. Further, we have already shown that the disclosure rule's lines are bright and that licensors have little to fear from spurious litigation." If we are correct, then we can expect prices to be fair because they should correspond to the actual value of the licensed software.
B. Additional Normative Grounds
Several additional theories and principles support or explain the material-defect disclosure rule. For example, under the principle of autonomy, a licensee's agreement is not voluntary if the licensee does not have the material facts. Closely related, corrective justice requires a legal system that has "respect and concern for people who are duped."3 In the context of software licensing, the law therefore should
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See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 113 (cited in note 11) (theorizing that competitors are unlikely to disclose defects that their products share).
29
Id at 112-13.
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See Alon Harel and Yuval Procaccia, On the Optimal Regulation of Unread Contracts *4 (unpublished manuscript, Sept 2009), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473770 (visited Oct 28, 2010) (reasoning that with "low-probability contingencies ... potential transmitters of ... information will be small, and hence reputation will perform poorly as a vehicle for market correction"). seek to ensure that the licensee makes knowledgeable decisions about her assets."
Contractarians posit that "individuals behind a veil of ignorance but aware of their cultural and social context" would assent to rules that protect a party from catastrophe.' Accordingly, a party must disclose "deep secrets," meaning that the other party reasonably has no knowledge of the information.' A party should also disclose "shallow secrets," in which the other party has an inkling of the secret, if the first party received the information because of its "special advantage."" In the context of software disclosure, contractarians would therefore argue that the licensor must disclose material hidden defects if the licensee reasonably is unaware that the software is defective. Even if the licensee has some knowledge of a problem but is reasonably unaware of the specifics, contractarians would urge a disclosure duty.
Moralists would require disclosure as a matter of right and wrong. For example, moralists argue that it is "impermissible to take advantage of another party's ignorance of material facts."' Further, " [u] sing [] ignorance to increase one's own profits violates respect for persons." 41 Failure to disclose known material defects in software also constitutes bad faith under this interpretation. ince a contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept."). 40 Ramsay, 56 U Toronto L J at 134-38 (cited in note 11), discussing Fried, Contract as Promise at 78-83 (cited in note 39) (presenting a corrective theory of fraud). [78: 95 requirement at common law. 43 Prospect theory observes that people suffer from a loss of assets more than they feel good about a comparable gain in assets." Consistent with the theory, the law requires sellers to disclose material information about goods because the buyer loses (is made worse off) if the buyer purchases worthless goods. On the other hand, if a buyer fails to disclose material facts, then the seller foregoes a gain. "Seller does not exactly lose anything . .. by selling without Buyer's information.
[Seller] sells at a price equal to or above the market price.
[Seller] is merely deprived of the benefit created by Buyer's investment."" The law of disclosure simply may reflect this cognitive bias.
Disclosure about the facts relating to the quality of software is not the only kind of disclosure in the ALI Principles. We now turn to the issue of disclosure of standard terms.
II. DISCLOSING TERMS
A well-accepted proposition is that, for a host of reasons, people do not read their standard forms." Further, electronic commerce may have exacerbated the problem." These realities create a dilemma for contract law in the electronic age. For example, they undermine contract law's paradigm of assent by knowledgeable parties." They also increase the likelihood that some licensors will draft terms that overreach. 49 What 43 Thanks to Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski for this insight. Ramsay analyzes the asymmetry, but does not focus on prospect theory. See Ramsay, 56 U Toronto L J at 123-32 (cited in note 11). For a discussion of this psychological theory as it applies to disclosure, see Eisenberg, 91 Cal L Rev at 1675-76 (cited in note 11) ("[N]ondisclosure by a seller usually results in a loss to the buyer, since the commodity is worth significantly less than he pays for it. Because a loss is felt more sharply than a forgone gain, there is extra reason to be solicitous about protecting buyers against nondisclosure sellers."). 44 See Eisenberg, 91 Cal L Rev at 1675 (cited in note 11). 45 Borden, 73 Mo L Rev at 700 (cited in note 8) (arguing that a seller who is duped "has no conventional expectation of ... surplus"). 
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Id at 482-83. 49 See Craswell, 92 Va L Rev at 591 (cited in note 8):
[I]f consumers have perfect information about the prices offered by different sellers, and perfect information about the average effects of contract terms in sellers' standard forms, but if they have no information (or only poor information) about the effect of the contract terms used by any individual seller, each seller will then have an incentive to degrade the "quality" of its terms.
should contract law, and in this instance, the ALI Principles, do about this problem? One of us has written extensively on this subject, and we will not repeat many of the arguments here.' Instead, we simply set forth and then defend the ALI Principles' disclosure-of-terms strategy against concerns of some analysts.
The ALI Principles do not require a precontract disclosure of terms." Instead, the Principles set forth a safe harbor that ensures enforcement of standard forms so long as they are not unconscionable or against public policy.' The safe harbor requires software licensors, among other things, to make their forms available on the Internet prior to any transaction so that a prospective customer can shop around for terms if so inclined." Admittedly, few people likely will do so, which is the principal basis for complaints about the disclosure strategy, although we believe that the situation may not be as hopeless as some allege.' Nevertheless, here we rest the justification for a disclosure safe ncreased disclosure alone cannot be counted upon to make a difference, and it is dangerous to believe otherwise."). See also id at 172 ("Increased disclosure regimes have been broadly criticized for being ineffective.").
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Nor is the disclosure safe harbor the ALI Principles' sole approach to standard forms. ven with a 'robust' opportunity to review the information about the contract terms, very few individuals will jump on this opportunity and actually read."). Notwithstanding Professor Omri Ben-Shahar's criticism of disclosure, we believe that increasing access to standard forms on the Internet reduces some of the roadblocks to reading, such as time constraints and search costs. Nevertheless, in the following discussion we assume that people will not read their standard forms for all of the reasons discussed in Professor Ben-Shahar's provocative article. But we confess to some confusion over whether Professor Ben-Shahar sees any value in disclosure. We think that he does. For example, he is comfortable with the terms-after-payment process only if "there is an option not to take the contract as a whole." Id at 11-12. Apparently, terms-after-payment is satisfactory to Professor Ben-Shahar because the purchaser can exercise the option to reject the contract after having the opportunity to read the terms. See also Marotta-Wurgler, 78 U Chi L Rev at 167-68 (cited in harbor on other grounds. In addition, we argue that the cost of disclosure is negligible. Finally, we assert that alternative proposals either are unrealistic and expensive or can easily supplement the disclosure rule.
The opportunity to read a standard form is important in part because it substantiates assent to the form even if a party does not read it. The ALI Principles reason that
[i]ncreasing the opportunity to read supports autonomy reasons for enforcing software standard forms and substantiates Karl Llewellyn's conception of [licensees'] "blanket assent" to reasonable standard terms, so long as they have had a reasonable opportunity to read them. Blanket assent means that [licensees] have delegated to the drafter the duty of drafting reasonable boilerplate terms, just as they delegate to software [licensors] and engineers the duty of creating the appropriate software for the task at hand."
Llewellyn's "blanket asset" approach is more than an abstraction. It describes the reality of what is in the minds of reasonable people who agree to standard forms. But there is more. A fundamental tenet of the rule of law is reasonable notice. For example, in criminal law, "fair warning" requires that the law "explicit[ly] [ ] inform those who are subject to [the law] what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."' The goal is to "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."" Yet we all know that people rarely read criminal statutes or understand many of the intricacies of rules governing even those wrongs of which they are aware, such as murder or theft. The point is that people could gain access to these materials, which legitimizes the rules as note 51) (concluding from empirical evidence that "contract accessibility does not result in an economically significant increase in readership" and suggesting that the promotion of "increased disclosure would be ineffective and could even introduce new costs and inefficiencies").
55 ALI Principles at 118 (cited in note 1). it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.").
law. Further, the importance of the common law principle of stare decisis does not depend on the proposition that people actually know and understand precedent, but on the notion that the legal texts are available to them." That is why courts take great pains to legitimize decisions that stray from precedent by distinguishing the cases on the facts even in situations where it is clear that the parties did not have an inkling of that precedent.
Standard forms constitute private legislation backed by the state's enforcement processes, and the legitimacy of these forms also depends on reasonable notice of content. In fact, adequate notice of terms constitutes a foundation for much of contract doctrine, including rules of interpretation (such as interpreting terms against the drafter), the parol evidence rule, and, of course, the general rules of formation. To be sure, creating a safe harbor that requires greater access to standard forms is a modest contribution if the goal is to increase reading. But it is a crucial step if the goal is to create legitimacy in the contracting process.
Increasing the opportunity to read also may lead to the improvement of the quality of standard forms. As we have said, we doubt that disclosure will increase the numbers of readers substantially. Nor do we subscribe to the argument that a few readers create sufficient incentives for licensors to improve the quality of terms." But watchdog groups have already sprung up on the Internet, and the digital revolution means that information they collect about "dangerous A potential cost of disclosure that one of us has described in detail previously is that disclosure will increase the possibility that marginal terms will be enforceable, because disclosure eliminates the argument that such terms are procedurally unconscionable."' Many businesses do not make their standard forms available prior to a transaction, however, (Feb 15, 2009 ), online at http://consumerist.com/5150175/ facebooks-new-terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-we-want-with-your-content-forever (visited Oct 28,2010).
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See Brad Stone and Brian Stelter, Facebook Withdraws Changes in Data Use, NY Times B1 (Feb 19, 2009 ) ("After three days of pressure from angry users and the threat of a formal legal complaint by a coalition of consumer advocacy groups, the company reversed changes to its contract with users that had appeared to give it perpetual ownership of their contributions to the service.").
65 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment f at 132 (cited in note 1). 66 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment g at 132-33 (cited in note 1). suggesting that they believe that the costs of disclosure outweigh the benefit of creating a litigation defense.' Perhaps these secretive businesses worry about the long term, believing that eventually word will get out about their marginal terms. If this prediction is accurate, then disclosure ultimately will benefit software end users notwithstanding a possible drop in successful unconscionability cases.' Finally, alternative proposals either are unrealistic because they are too expensive or unwieldy or could easily supplement the disclosure safe harbor.' For example, one proposal, discussed and rejected in the ALI Principles, is to enforce terms only if a licensee clicks "I agree" at the end of each term-or at least the particularly contentious ones, such as forum selection and dispute resolution terms." Neither licensors nor licensees desire the contract formation process to become bogged down in such formalities, which ultimately may not promote any additional reading anyway.
An additional proposal is to create a government agency to provide oversight or even preapproval of the content of standard forms.' This strikes us as costly and subject to the common pitfalls of administrative rulemaking, including agency capture by the software industry, lack of agency resources, and inattention to context-dependent variables. In addition, as a matter of principle, agency involvement is troublesome because it increases government intrusion into what should remain an essentially private process.7
Another proposal is for the private sector to rate contracts, just as rating services presently evaluate restaurants and hotels, among other things.' Of course, the disclosure rule discussed here does not contradict or impede such a strategy. In fact, we have already discussed the importance of watchdog groups and would applaud their employment of a systematic rating service, if indeed the quality of terms can be so rated." But, of course, for such ratings to succeed, the first step would be to make standard forms easily accessible, which is precisely what the ALI Principles seek.
A final strategy worth mentioning, in the case of terms-afterpayment, is to identify and label important provisions on packaged software." Disclosure of terms on the Internet does not impede this reform either. In fact, the ALI Principles admonish software providers to disclose terms on the package." A challenge will be selecting the terms that must appear on the package without repeating most of the contract there.
We now discuss a third kind of disclosure, namely disclosure of ex post remedial strategies. 
III. DISCLOSING Ex POST STRATEGIES
Contract
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The University of Chicago Law Review [78:95 particular type of postbreach conduct in business settings-the nonbreaching licensor's automated disablement of software resident on the breaching party's computer." The Principles place several restrictions on such disablement, including that the term authorizing it must be in the agreement and be conspicuous."
Automated disablement of software is essentially a high-tech version of self-help. Historically, contract law-most notably the UCC in the context of secured transactions-has not required disclosure in the agreement of an intent to use self-help.' Rather, the nonbreaching party may simply rely on the background law to exercise self-help in the event of breach. Why do we depart from that approach here?
As we noted earlier in the context of a duty to disclose material defects, disclosure can increase the flow of information and therefore the likelihood that each party will value what it receives more than what it gives up.' Although self-help has a long history under UCC Parties often contract around the default remedies, however, by setting liquidated damages or limiting remedies. Such liquidation or limitation generally must be a part of the agreement itself, thus effectively requiring disclosure of postbreach strategy. UCC § 2-718(1) ("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement."); UCC § 2-719(1)(a) ("(T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article.").
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See ALI Principles § 4.03(a) at 263 (cited in note 1) ("'Automated disablement' means the use of electronic means to disable or materially impair the functionality of software."). See also ALI Principles § 4.03(a), comment a at 264 (cited in note 1) ("The Section applies ... in both the remedial and other contexts."). In this Article, we concentrate on electronic disablement as a remedy for breach.
The Principles do not permit automated disablement in a consumer agreement or in a standard-form transfer of generally available software. ALI Principles § 4.03(c) at 263 (cited in note 1). The Principles define "consumer agreement" as "an agreement for the transfer of software or access to software primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." ALl Principles § 1.01(d) at 7 (cited in note 1). They define "standard-form transfer of generally available software" as "a transfer using a standard form of (1) a small number of copies of software to an end user; or (2) the right to access software to a small number of end users," provided that "the software is generally available to the public under substantially the same standard terms." ALI Principles Article 9, the use of electronic self-help is a relatively recent phenomenon, and whether a licensee would expect its use in the absence of a contractual term is an open question." We think that the licensee often would not and, in particular, that an intent to use automated disablement alters the valuation of the contract such that, were it not disclosed, the licensee would pay too much for the software.
To disable remotely software resident on another computer requires that the software provider write its code to include a way to enter the licensee's system from outside-a so-called "back door.""5 The mere existence of this back door places the licensee's system at risk by making it less secure.' Further, computers generally have a number of software programs and accompanying data installed. Automated disablement can adversely affect programs and data having nothing to do with the contractual dispute between the parties.' Damages from disablement can be quite high: lack of access to software and data can have far-reaching effects on the licensee and third parties with whom the licensee's system is networked or with whom it does business. ' Additionally, breach of contract is often a highly contextual inquiry. Complicating matters in the area of software contracting is the overlay of federal intellectual property law that may bear on the The difficulty with examining electronic self-help under existing law is that the common law and the UCC rules were not developed with attention to the protective capability of digital systems or to their potential for abuse. The ability to disable the other party's use of the technology creates strong leverage to enforce performance. This benefits licensors, but leverage can mount into undesirable duress or coercion. 88 See id at 212-13. enforceability of particular provisions.' For example, a party may premise the right to automated disablement on breach of a contractual provision against reverse engineering. But patent law, copyright law, or both may render that provision unenforceable and thus the disablement (that may cause large damages) wrongful.' Unlike repossession of tangible goods, electronic repossession of informational goods implicates difficult questions of intellectual property law, suggesting that more caution is appropriate in this context.9 UCC Article 9's self-help repossession scheme is limited by the malleable concept of breach of the peace.' A repossession carried out in breach of the peace is wrongful, and the debtor is entitled to damages.' The breach of the peace limitation makes it difficult for a foreclosing secured party to enter the debtor's dwelling or place of business to repossess collateral in the absence of the debtor's consent."
At first glance, electronic self-help seems to eliminate any breach of the peace issue. To the extent that the breach of the peace limitation is intended to forestall the violence inherent in a face-to-face confrontation over repossession, this is indeed the case. The breach of the peace doctrine in Article 9, however, may vindicate interests in addition to preventing violence, including "protect debtors, by contesting repossession, to force creditors to proceed by action."' The expectation of privacy in the sense of freedom from nonconsensual intrusion is an evolving concept in the high-tech area, but there is some evidence that consumers, at least, are likely to react with dismay when vendors monitor their computer activities in one way or another. ' We think that businesses would also be surprised by an automated disablement of software in the absence of a contractual provision permitting it.
For all of these reasons, we believe that requiring disclosure of an intent to use electronic means to disable software remotely is amply justified.' Disclosure as a condition of enforcement is not costly and will force the software licensor to bring to the licensee's attention its intent to use this unusual, intrusive remedy. The licensee can then make an informed judgment about whether to enter into the agreement and at what price.
Some parties interested in the Principles objected to our prohibiting electronic self-help in consumer agreements and in other retaillike transactions.' In both of these contexts, we believe that disclosure in the agreement is insufficient to drive home to the licensee the possibility and ramifications of automated disablement. In part, this is because, as we have noted, consumers are unlikely to read their standard forms.' In addition, consumers and other licensees in retail transactions likely will not appreciate and correctly value the potentially dire consequences of remote disablement.o Others objected to our imposing burdens in addition to disclosure-notice, an opportunity to cure, and obtaining a court order before engaging in automated disablement."o' The Principles also provide for damages for violation of the restrictions on automated disablement notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary and make the obligations in the relevant section nonwaivable." Justifying these requirements is beyond the scope of this Article. Here we simply note that disclosure is one part of a multifaceted approach to automated disablement." 
